Algebraic Techniques for Short(er) Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Efficient Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Arguments with Standard Soundness: Construction and Applications

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Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs

In zero-knowledge proofs for lattice cryptography we want to prove knowledge of a short vector \vec{w} over \mathbb{Z}_q such that

$$A\vec{w} = \vec{v},$$

where the matrix \boldsymbol{A} and the vector $\vec{\boldsymbol{v}}$ are publicly known.

Example:

Proving knowledge of a Ring-LWE secret $s \in \mathcal{R}$ such that v = as + e. In this case

$$m{A} = (m{a}, m{1})$$
 $m{ec{w}} = egin{pmatrix} m{s} \\ m{e} \end{pmatrix}$

In our works:

New more efficient proof systems! Size for Ring-LWE sample: 384KB

Other Proof Systems

Approximate Proofs

Prove knowledge of *longer* vector \vec{v} such that $A\vec{w} = \bar{\alpha}\vec{v}$ where $\bar{\alpha}$ is a short polynomial.

Ammortized Proofs

Prove knowledge of many *longer* vectors \vec{w}_i such that $A\vec{w}_i = \vec{v}_i$ for all i.

Timed Post-Quantum Proofs

Prove equation $A\vec{w} = \vec{v}$ exactly but using discrete-log assumption

Overview

Prover provides masked secret polynomial ${\it z}={\it r}+\alpha {\it w}$ with masking polynomial ${\it r}$ and challenge polynomial α

In approximate proofs: Intermediately sized r masks short αw via rejection sampling; length of z determines length of extracted secret (after rewinding)

Committing to masking vector \vec{r} via $\vec{t} = A\vec{r}$ shows extracted secret is solution to the equation

Overview of our Techniques

Prover also proves that each coefficient of secret vector is in a small interval, e.g. binary.

The polynomial w has binary coefficients if and only if

$$oldsymbol{w} \circ (\hat{f 1} - oldsymbol{w}) = oldsymbol{0}$$

Replacing \mathbf{w} by a masking $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{r} + \alpha \mathbf{w}$ of \mathbf{w} means the term we are interested in appears as the leading coefficient of the resulting polynomial in $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and is separated from *garbage* terms:

$$z \circ (\alpha \hat{\mathbf{1}} - z) = -r \circ r + r \circ (\hat{\mathbf{1}} - 2w)\alpha + w \circ (\hat{\mathbf{1}} - w)\alpha^2$$

If the verifier is convinced that z is of the correct form, independently of α , then he is convinced that w is binary if the leading term vanishes

Overview of our Techniques

Observations:

- Proving something about individual coeffcients is inherently componentwise. This seems to preclude polynomial challenges.
- ② Uniform challenges $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ mean we need uniform masking polynomials \vec{r}
- $\vec{t} = A\vec{r}$ does not bind \vec{r} anymore

Homomorphic Commitment scheme

Will need a commitment scheme over \mathcal{R} that permits to compute \mathcal{R} -linear expressions in committed form.

$$\mathbf{a} \operatorname{Commit}(\mathbf{m}) + \mathbf{b} \operatorname{Commit}(\mathbf{m}') = \operatorname{Commit}(\mathbf{am} + \mathbf{bm}')$$

Then a proof that a commitment is a commitment to zero can be used to prove linear relations in zero-knowledge

Proving that Masking is of Correct Form

The prover provides commitments

$$C_r = \text{Commit}(r),$$
 $C_w = \text{Commit}(w),$

and a proof that $C_r + \alpha C_w$ is a commitment to $z = r + \alpha w$.

That is, a proof that $C_r + \alpha C_w - \text{Commit}(z)$ is a commitment to zero

Proving Binary Coefficients — First Method

The prover provides commitments to the garbage terms,

$$C_0 = \operatorname{Commit}(-r \circ r),$$
 $C_1 = \operatorname{Commit}(r \circ (\hat{\mathbf{1}} - 2w)),$

and gives a proof that $C_0 + \alpha C_1$ is a commitment to $\mathbf{z} \circ (\alpha \hat{\mathbf{1}} - \mathbf{z})$

Proving Binary Coefficients — Second Method

A different approach in Bootle-Lyubashevsky-Seiler

Polynomial product translates to pointwise product in NTT representation

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathsf{NTT}(\boldsymbol{z}(\alpha-\boldsymbol{z})) \\ &= \mathsf{NTT}(-\boldsymbol{r}^2 + \alpha \boldsymbol{r}(\boldsymbol{1}-\boldsymbol{2}\boldsymbol{w}) + \alpha^2 \boldsymbol{w}(\boldsymbol{1}-\boldsymbol{w})) \\ &= -\mathsf{NTT}(\boldsymbol{r}^2) + \alpha \, \mathsf{NTT}(\boldsymbol{r}(\boldsymbol{1}-\boldsymbol{2}\boldsymbol{w})) + \alpha^2 \, \mathsf{NTT}(\boldsymbol{w}) \circ (\hat{\boldsymbol{1}}-\mathsf{NTT}(\boldsymbol{w})) \end{aligned}$$

A proof that $\mathbf{z}(\alpha - \mathbf{z})$ is of degree one in α shows that the NTT of the secret has binary coefficients

Outline

- The Main Protocol
- Applications of the Main Protocol
- Our Results

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for

Linear Equations with Quadratic Constraints

$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{v} \\ \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{w}) = \mathbf{0} \\ deg(\mathbf{f}) = 2 \end{cases}$$
 A Simplified Example
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{v} \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Starting Point:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{3}$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q}$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$z$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$


Observation:

$$\begin{cases} z_{2}z_{3} = w_{2}w_{3}\alpha^{2} + (r_{2}w_{3} + r_{3}w_{2})\alpha + r_{2}r_{3} \\ z_{1}\alpha = w_{1}\alpha^{2} + r_{1}\alpha \end{cases}$$

$$\downarrow z_{2}z_{3} - z_{1}\alpha = (w_{2}w_{3} - w_{1})\alpha^{2} + (r_{2}w_{3} + r_{3}w_{2} - r_{1})\alpha + r_{2}r_{3}$$

$$\uparrow d$$

$$\downarrow d$$



Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Attempt I:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{3}$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_{2}w_{3} + r_{3}w_{2} - r_{1}), b = r_{2}r_{3}$$

$$C_{a} = \text{Com}(a; s_{a})$$

$$C_{b} = \text{Com}(b; s_{b}) \qquad t, C_{a}, C_{b}$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q}$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$z$$

$$d = z_{2}z_{3} - z_{1}\alpha$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$Com(d) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_{a} + C_{b}$$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Attempt I:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_2w_3 + r_3w_2 - r_1), b = r_2r_3$$

$$C_a = \text{Com}(a; s_a)$$

$$C_b = \text{Com}(b; s_b)$$

$$t, C_a, C_b$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$t = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$th$$

$$d = z_2z_3 - z_1\alpha$$

$$Az = \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$Com(d) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$$

How to check

this?

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Attempt II:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_2w_3 + r_3w_2 - r_1), b = r_2r_3$$

$$C_a = \text{Com}(a; s_a)$$

$$C_b = \text{Com}(b; s_b) \qquad t, C_a, C_b$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$s = \alpha \cdot s_a + s_b \qquad z, s$$

$$d = z_2z_3 - z_1\alpha$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

 $Com(d; s) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Attempt II:

$$\begin{aligned} \boldsymbol{r} &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3 \\ \boldsymbol{t} &= \boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{r} \\ \boldsymbol{a} &= (r_2 w_3 + r_3 w_2 - r_1), \boldsymbol{b} = r_2 r_3 \\ \boldsymbol{C}_a &= \operatorname{Com}(a; s_a) \\ \boldsymbol{C}_b &= \operatorname{Com}(b; s_b) \qquad \boldsymbol{t}, \boldsymbol{C}_a, \boldsymbol{C}_b \end{aligned}$$

 $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

Zero-Knowledge?

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$s = \alpha \cdot s_a + s_b$$

$$z, s$$

$$d = z_2 z_3 - z_1 \alpha$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$Com(d; s) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Attempt III:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_2w_3 + r_3w_2 - r_1), b = r_2r_3$$

$$C_a = \text{Com}(a; s_a)$$

$$C_b = \text{Com}(b; s_b)$$

$$t, C_a, C_b$$

A Variant of [BDL+ 18] Commitment:

Public Key: Random matrices B_1, B_2

$$c \leftarrow D_{\sigma};$$
Commit a message a :
$$c = \begin{pmatrix} I & B_1 \\ \mathbf{0} & I & B_2 \end{pmatrix} \cdot s + \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ a \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$s = \alpha \cdot s_a + s_b$$
Abort with Probability
$$1 - \frac{D_{\sigma}(s)}{M \cdot D_{\alpha \cdot s_a \cdot \sigma}(s)}$$

$$z,s$$

$$d = z_2 z_3 - z_1 \alpha$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$\operatorname{Com}(d; s) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Protocol:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_2w_3 + r_3w_2 - r_1), b = r_2r_3$$

$$C_a = \text{Com}(a; s_a)$$

$$C_b = \text{Com}(b; s_b)$$

$$t, C_a, C_b$$

Some tedious part:

- 1. Commit the witness.
- 2. Arguing correctness of commitments (Using Fiat-Shamir with Abort Protocol for commitments).

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$s = \alpha \cdot s_a + s_b \qquad z,s$$
Abort with Probability
$$1 - \frac{D_{\sigma}(s)}{M \cdot D_{\alpha \cdot s_a, \sigma}(s)}$$

$$d = z_2 z_3 - z_1 \alpha$$

$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$Com(d; s) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$$

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \end{pmatrix} = v \\ w_1 = w_2 \cdot w_3 \end{cases}$$
 $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times 3}$

Protocol:

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^3$$

$$t = Ar$$

$$a = (r_2w_3 + r_3w_2 - r_1), b = r_2r_3$$

$$C_a = \text{Com}(a; s_a)$$

$$C_b = \text{Com}(b; s_b)$$

$$t, C_a, C_b$$

Standard Soundness: ✓
High Efficiency: ✓ (if *p* is not too small)

$$\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$z = \alpha \cdot w + r$$

$$s = \alpha \cdot s_a + s_b$$
Abort with Probability
$$d = z_2 z_3 - z_1 \alpha$$


$$Az \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot v + t$$

$$Com(d; s) \stackrel{?}{=} \alpha \cdot C_a + C_b$$

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- Our Results

Applications of the Main Protocol



Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for

Linear Equations with Short Solutions

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{v} \\ \forall i \in [n], \ 0 \le \mathbf{w}_i \le \beta \end{cases}$$
 (Assume $\beta = 2^k - 1$)

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Linear Equations with Short Solutions

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{v} \\ \forall i \in [n], \ 0 \le \mathbf{w}_i \le \beta \end{cases}$$
 (Assume $\beta = 2^k - 1$)

Observation I:

$$0 \le a \le \beta \iff \exists a_1, \dots a_k \in \{0,1\}^k, a = \sum_{i=1}^k a_i \cdot 2^{k-1}$$

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Linear Equations with Short Solutions

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A \cdot \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{v} \\ \forall i \in [n], \ 0 \le \mathbf{w}_i \le \beta \end{cases}$$
 (Assume $\beta = 2^k - 1$)

Step I:

$$\mathbf{w} = \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_n \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{Bit Decomposition}$$

$$w_i = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 4 & \dots & 2^{k-1} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_{i,1} \\ w_{i,2} \\ w_{i,3} \\ \vdots \\ w_{i,k} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{w}_{n,1} = \mathbf{w}'$$

New Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A' \cdot w' = v \\ w' \in \{0,1\}^{nk} \end{cases}$$

$$A' = A \cdot G$$
, $G = \begin{pmatrix} g & & & \\ & g & & \\ & & \ddots & & \\ & & & g \end{pmatrix}$, $g = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 4 & \dots & 2^{k-1} \end{pmatrix}$

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Linear Equations with Short Solutions

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A' \cdot w' = v \\ w' \in \{0,1\}^{nk} \end{cases}$$

Observation II: $a \in \{0,1\} \iff a^2 = a \mod q$ (Assume q is a prime)

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Linear Equations with Short Solutions

Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A' \cdot w' = v \\ w' \in \{0,1\}^{nk} \end{cases}$$

Step II:



New Goal:
$$\begin{cases} A' \cdot w' = v \\ \forall i \in [nk], \ w'_i = w'_i \cdot w'_i \end{cases}$$

Quadratic Constraints


Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for

Subset Sum of Linear Equations

$$\begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^m b_i \cdot A_i \cdot \mathbf{w}_i = \mathbf{v} \\ b_i \in \{0,1\} \end{cases}$$
 A Simplified Example
$$\begin{cases} b_1 \cdot A_1 \cdot \mathbf{w}_1 + b_2 \cdot A_2 \cdot \mathbf{w}_2 = \mathbf{v} \\ b_1 \in \{0,1\} \\ b_2 \in \{0,1\} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbf{w}_1, \mathbf{w}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^1$$

Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Subset Sum of Linear Equations



New Goal:


$$\begin{cases}
A_{1} \cdot w'_{1} + A_{2} \cdot w'_{2} = v \\
w'_{1} = b_{1} \cdot w_{1} \\
w'_{2} = b_{2} \cdot w_{2} \\
b_{1} = b_{1} \cdot b_{1} \\
b_{2} = b_{2} \cdot b_{2}
\end{cases}$$

Linear Equation

Quadratic Constraints


Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for

Linear Equations with Hidden Matrix




Zero-Knowledge Arguments (of Knowledge) for Linear Equations with Hidden Matrix

Goal:
$$\begin{pmatrix} A_{1,1} & A_{1,2} \\ A_{2,1} & A_{2,2} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ w_2 \end{pmatrix} = v$$



$$u_{1,1} = A_{1,1} \cdot w_1, \quad u_{1,2} = A_{1,2} \cdot w_2$$
 $u_{2,1} = A_{2,1} \cdot w_1, \quad u_{2,2} = A_{2,2} \cdot w_2$


Summary




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The Roadmap




The Roadmap



The Comparison

	Stern-Type	Our Solution	Fiat-Shamir with Abort
ZKAoK for PKE	[LNSW 13]		[BCK+ 14]
ZKAoK for Commitment	[XXW 13]		[BKLP 15]
ZKAoK for Signature	[LLM+ 16]		[BCN 18]
ZKAoK for Accumulator	[LLNW 16]		
ZKAoK for (w)PRF	[LLNW 17]		

The Roadmap



The Comparison

	Stern-Type	Our Solution	FSwA (Ideal Lattice)
Ring Signature	47.3MB	4.24MB	1.41MB
Group Signature	61.5MB	6.94MB	0.58MB
E-Cash	≈ 720TB	262MB	N/A
Range Proof	3.54MB	1.21MB	N/A

Communication Cost for typical applications (2^{10} users, 80-bit security).

More Efficient



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